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ARBITRATION-UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT SOUNDS THE DEATH KNELL FOR CLASS
ARBITRATION-STOL T-NIELSEN S.A. V
ANIMALFEEDS INT'L CORP., 130 S. CT. 1758 (2010)
Over the last few decades arbitration has gained increasing
popularity because consumer, commercial, and employment contracts
regularly incorporate mandatory arbitration clauses.' As a result, numerous
questions exist regarding the scope and enforceability of arbitration
clauses, particularly with respect to the use of class arbitration. In StoltNielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International, Corp.,' the United States
Supreme Court considered whether imposing class arbitration on parties
whose arbitration clauses are silent on the use of class arbitration is
consistent with the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA")-an issue that
previously divided federal courts. 4 Sharply retreating from precedent, the
Court held that the FAA prohibits arbitrators from imposing class
arbitration on parties who did not previously agree to such a stipulation.'
Stolt-Nielsen S.A., joined by other petitioner-companies in the

See Carole J. Buckner, Toward a Pure Arbitral Paradigm of Classwide Arbitration:
Arbitral Power and FederalPreemption, 82 DENy. U.L. REv. 301, 301-03 (2004) (highlighting
class arbitration's growing importance for consumer and employment contracts); Thomas J.
Stipanowich, Punitive Damages and the Consumerizationof Arbitration, 92 NW. U. L. REv. 1, 3
(1997) ([A]rbitration is suddenly everywhere. A veritable surrogate for the public justice
system, it touches the lives of many persons who, because of their status as investors, employees,
franchisees, consumers of medical care, homeowners, and signatories to standardized contracts,
are bound to private processes traditionally employed by commercial parties.").
2 See Buckner, supra note 1, at 303-05 (classifying class arbitration law as new and emerging
field with many unsettled procedural issues); James E. McGuire & Bette J. Roth, Class Action
Arbitrations: A First Circuit Update, 52 B. B.J. 17, 19 (2008) (concluding laws governing
prohibitions on class-wide arbitration are unsettled).
3 (StoltNielsen 111), 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010).
4 See id. at 1766-67 (identifying issue on appeal); see also Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C.
§§ 1-16 (2006). Compare Champ v. Siegel Trading Co., 55 F.3d 269, 275 (7th Cir. 1995)
(rejecting class arbitration's use where arbitration clause is silent on consolidation), with Certain
Underwriters at Lloyd's London v. Westchester Fire Ins., 489 F.3d 580, 590 (3d Cir. 2007)
(holding silence does not preclude consolidation), Rollins, Inc. v. Garrett, 176 F. App'x 968, 969
(1 lth Cir. Apr. 19, 2006) (concluding silence does not preclude class arbitration and prohibition
of class arbitration is unconscionable).
5 Stolt-Nielsen 111, 130 S. Ct. at 1775 (announcing Court's holding). But see Green Tree Fin.
Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 452-53 (2003) (refusing to interpret arbitration clause because
arbitrators are "well situated" to interpret agreement); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 9
(1984) (declining to decide whether state law permits class arbitration because Court did not have
authority).
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case, is a shipping company that charters parcel tankers to customers that
ship liquids in small quantities.6 AnimalFeeds, the respondent, is a
customer that ships its goods pursuant to a charter party contract that
contains a mandatory arbitration clause. 7 In 2003, AnimalFeeds filed an

antitrust suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania against the petitioners alleging that the petitioners had
engaged in a global conspiracy to restrain competition in the parcel tanker
shipping industry through price fixing.8 A judicial panel on multi-district
legislation transferred the case to the District of Connecticut, where StoltNielsen moved to compel arbitration. 9 The district court denied the motion,
which the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
subsequently reversed, holding that the charter party agreements governed
the proceedings and contained legally enforceable agreements to arbitrate. 10
The parties commenced arbitration and entered into an agreement
requiring the arbitrators to follow and apply Rule 3 and Rule 7 of the
American Arbitration Association's ("AAA") Supplementary Rules for
Class Arbitrations."
The arbitration panel interpreted the arbitration
6

Stolt-Nielsen III, 130 S.Ct. at 1764 (describing petitioners' businesses). Parcel tankers

contain individual compartments that are chartered to customers wishing to ship liquids in small
amounts. Id.
7 Id. at 1764-65 (identifying contractual relationship between respondents and petitioners).
8 See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp. (Stolt-Nielsen II), 548 F.3d 85, 87-88 (2d
Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2793 (2009) (noting initial cause of action and case's
procedural history). AnimalFeeds alleged that the price fixing scheme violated the federal
antitrust laws. 130 S.Ct. at 1761. AnimalFeeds based this allegation on a Department of Justice
criminal investigation that revealed the petitioners conspired to illegally fix their prices. Id. at
1765.
9 Stolt-Nielsen H, 548 F.3d at 87-88 (outlining case's procedural history); see also In re
Parcel Tanker Shipping Servs. Antitrust Litig., 296 F. Supp. 2d 1370, 1371 & n.2 (J.P.M.L.
2003).
10 Stolt-Nielsen II, 548 F.3d at 88; see also JLM Indus., Inc. v. Stolt-Nielsen S.A., 387 F.3d
163, 168 (2d Cir. 2004) (summarizing rationale for dismissing claim because price-fixing
allegations were beyond scope of arbitration clauses).
11See Stolt-Nielsen II, 548 F.3d at 88 (outlining rules governing arbitration hearings). Rule 3
provides in pertinent part:
Upon appointment, the arbitrator shall determine as a threshold matter, in a reasoned,
partial final award on the construction of the arbitration clause, whether the applicable
arbitration clause permits the arbitration to proceed on behalf of or against a class (the
"Clause Construction Award"). The arbitrator shall stay all proceedings following the
issuance of the Clause Construction Award for a period of at least 30 days to permit
any party to move a court of competent jurisdiction to confirm or to vacate the Clause
Construction Award.
Am. Arbitration Ass'n, Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations (Nov. 10, 2010),
http://www.adr.org/sp.aspid=21936 [hereinafter AAA Supplementary Rules]. Additionally, Rule
7 provides:
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clauses contained in two common charter party agreements, known as the
Vegoilvoy charter party and the Asbatankvoy charter party. 12 Both charter
parties mandate arbitration, but are silent on the issue of whether class
arbitration may be utilized.' 3 In December 2005, the arbitration panel ruled
that both agreements permit class arbitration, consistent with other
arbitration decisions considering this issue.' 4
Stolt-Nielsen petitioned the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York to vacate the arbitration panel's partial
award. 15 Granting Stolt-Nielsen's motion, the district court concluded that
the award was granted in "manifest disregard of the law."' 6 After

The final award on the merits in a class
class, shall be reasoned and shall define
shall also specify or describe those to
directed, those the arbitrator finds to be
elected to opt out of the class.
Id.
12

arbitration, whether or not favorable to the
the class with specificity. The final award
whom the notice provided in Rule 6 was
members of the class, and those who have

Stolt-Nielsen H, 548 F.3d at 88-89 (identifying source of conflict within the parties'

contract). The parties selected these charter parties for use when they entered into the shipping
contracts. Id. at 89. The shipping industry uses charter parties, specifically, so that a shipping
vessel's owner can charter the vessel, or part of the vessel, to customers for use in the
transportation of goods. Id. at 89 n.3.
13 Id. at 89 (elucidating broadly constructed arbitration agreements).
The Vegoilvoy
agreement, a broadly constructed arbitration clause, governed AnimalFeeds transactions. Id. at
88-89. The agreement stated:
Any dispute arising from the making, performance or termination of this Charter Party
shall be settled in New York, Owner and Charterer each appointing an arbitrator, who
shall be a merchant, broker or individual experienced in the shipping business; the two
thus chosen, if they cannot agree, shall nominate a third arbitrator who shall be an
Admiralty lawyer. Such arbitration shall be conducted in conformity with the
provisions and procedure of the United States Arbitration Act, and a judgment of the
Court shall be entered upon any award made by said arbitrator. Nothing in this clause
shall be deemed to waive Owner's right to lien on the cargo for freight, dead freight or
demurrage.
Id. at 89. The Asbatankvoy agreement, which governed a number of relevant transactions in this
dispute with many of the respondents, also has a broadly worded arbitration clause. Id.;
see StoltNielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp. (Stolt-Nielsen 1), 435 F. Supp. 2d 382, 384 n.1 (S.D.N.Y.
2006) (providing Asbatankvoy arbitration clause).
14 Stolt-Nielsen H, 548 F.3d 85, 89-90 (2d Cir. 2008) (explaining arbitration
panel's
decision). The panel relied on twenty-one decisions that utilized Rule 3 of the Supplementary
Rules, each decision held that silent arbitration clauses do not preclude class arbitration. Id. at 90;
see also sources cited supra note 2 and accompanying text (noting emerging case law reflects
unsettled questions on class arbitration).
15 Stolt-Nielsen II, 548 F.3d at 90 (detailing petitioner's response to arbitration panel's
award); see also Stolt-Nielsen 1, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 383-84 (outlining case's procedural posture).
16 Stolt-Nielsen 1, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 383-84 (stressing that arbitration panels cannot make
decisions in "manifest disregard of the law"). The district court outlined the parameters of the
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AnimalFeeds appealed, the Second Circuit reversed the district court's
decision. 17 The Second Circuit explained that the question presented is for
the arbitrators to decide, not the courts.' 8 Moreover, the court held that the
arbitration panel's construction of the clause was not in "manifest disregard
of the law" because no part of the FAA prohibits class arbitration where the
relevant arbitration clause is broadly worded in scope, but silent on the
issue. 19 Petitioner appealed
to the United States Supreme Court and the
20
Court granted certiorari.

Historically, there has always been a strong policy in favor of
resolving disputes through arbitration-one that the Supreme Court
emboldened through a series of decisions during the last decade. 2' In 2002,
the Court in Howsam v.Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.22 limited the scope of
arbitration issues that a court could address solely to the issue of whether
the parties submitted a particular dispute to arbitration. 23 One year later, in
Green Tree Financial Corp. v.Bazzle,24 the Court had the opportunity to

term:
[T]he doctrine of "manifest disregard" is to be invoked in exceptional circumstances
only ...[T]he Court must find "both that (1) the arbitrators knew of a governing legal
principles yet refused to apply it or ignored it altogether, and (2) the law ignored by the
arbitrators was well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable to the case.
Id. at 384 (quoting Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197, 202 (2d Cir. 1998). But see Hall
St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 584-85 (2008) (rejecting decision to vacate award based
on extra-statutory grounds, including "manifest disregard of the law").
17 Stolt-Nielsen II, 548 F.3d at 102.
18 Id. at 101-02 (highlighting Second Circuit's decision to remand).
The Second Circuit
reversed and remanded the case to the district court, instructing the district court to vacate the
previous decision. Id.
19 Stolt-Nielsen H, 548 F.3d at 99-101 (identifying rationale behind the Second Circuit's
decision); Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006) (outlining arbitration procedures).
20

Stolt-Nielsen 111, 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1764 (2010); Stolt-Nielsen H, 548 F.3d 85 (2d Cir.

2008).

See McGuire & Roth, supra note 2, at 18 (introducing Court's precedent on class
arbitration allowing arbitrators to decide certain issues); Kristen M. Blankley, Case Commentary,
ArbitrabilityAfter Green Tree v. Bazzle: Is There Anything Leftfor the Courts?, 65 OHIO ST. L.J.
697, 697-98 (2004) (articulating prior Supreme Court decisions broadening the arbitrators'
power).
21

22 537 U.S. 79 (2002).
23

Id. at 83-84 (holding courts have limited ability to hear arbitration issues). The Court in

Howsam held that courts could hear two types of threshold issues regarding arbitration: (1)
whether the parties are bound by the arbitration clause, and; (2) whether the arbitration clause
applies to the parties' dispute. Id. at 84. On the other hand, procedural issues that affect the final
disposition of the case were delegated to arbitrators. Id. at 84-85. The Court reasoned that
arbitrators had comparatively more knowledge in this area and presumably the parties' agreement
reflected that understanding. Id. at 83.
24 539 U.S. 444 (2003).
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consider whether class arbitration could be imposed on parties when the
agreement was "silent" on the issue. 25 However, the Court in Bazzle did
not reach that issue because the Court determined that as a threshold matter
the arbitrator, not the court, must decide whether the contract was in fact
silent on class arbitration.2 6 Additionally, in PacifiCareHealth Systems,
Inc. v. Book,27 the Supreme Court held that arbitrators should determine
issues pertaining to the enforceability of certain provisions within an
arbitration agreement, rather than courts.28
In particular, the Bazzle holding led many arbitration institutions to
create procedures to handle class action arbitrations. 29 For instance, the
American Arbitration Association promulgated special procedures to
facilitate class arbitration, while the International Chamber of Commerce
rules remained silent on class arbitration. 0 Additionally, federal and state
25

Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 447 (describing issue before the Court). In Bazzle, the plaintiffs signed

a contract to secure a home loan from the defendant, Green Tree Financial Corporation. Id. at
447-48. The contract contained a mandatory arbitration clause, but was apparently silent on
whether class arbitration was permissible. Id. at 448. The case began in the South Carolina trial
court and proceeded to the South Carolina Supreme Court. Id. at 449. "The Supreme Court of
South Carolina held (1) that the arbitration clauses are silent as to whether arbitration might take
the form of class arbitration, and (2) that, in that circumstance, South Carolina law interprets the
contracts as permitting class arbitration."' Id. at 447. The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari to "determine whether th[e] holding [was] consistent with the Federal Arbitration Act."
Id.
26 Id. at 450-51 (highlighting preliminary issue considered by Court in Bazzle regarding
contract's supposed silence). A threshold question for the Court involved whether the contract is
silent on class arbitration, or if it actually forbids class arbitration. Id. Exercising its discretion, a
plurality of the Court remanded the case to the arbitration panel to interpret the contracts
governing the dispute. Id. at 454; see also Buckner, supra note 1, at 302-03 (noting Bazzle
significantly expanded arbitrators' authority and scope of arbitration).
27 538 U.S. 401 (2003).
28 Id. at 406-07 (holding issues unrelated to arbitrability are limited to arbitrators' review).
In Book, a group of doctors brought claims against a number of HMOs under the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act ("RICO"). Id. at 402. The HMOs sought to compel
arbitration, but the doctors resisted because the arbitration agreement prohibited the recovery of
punitive damages. Id. at 403. Some circuits, however, allow tremble damages for the RICO
claim. Id. at 402-05. The Court in Book held that because this was not an issue of whether the
parties had agreed to arbitration or even whether a particular issue was subject to arbitration, it
was for the arbitrator to decide the enforceability of the provision. Id. at 406-07.
29 See American Arbitration Association Policy on Class Arbitrations (July 14,
2005), http://www.adr.org/sp.aspid=28779 [hereinafter AAA's Policy on Class Arbitrations]
(identifying AAA's response to Bazzle decision); William H. Baker, Class Action Arbitration, 10
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 335, 339-43 (2009) (noting arbitration institutions responded to
Bazzle by creating supplementary class arbitration rules).
Baker specifically outlines the
procedures instituted by the AAA and the Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services, Inc.
("JAMS") in response to Bazzle. Id. The AAA and JAMS created procedures to facilitate class
arbitration. Id.
30 See AAA Supplementary Rules, supra note 11 and accompanying text (announcing new
rules to facilitate class arbitration); Rules ofArbitration art. 15, INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
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courts continued to hold differing views on class arbitration particularly in
light of the Court's ambiguous ruling in Bazzle. 3' Many courts held that
class arbitration was an issue of contract interpretation and that such
procedural issues were ultimately for the arbitrator and not the courts to
decide.3 2 On the other hand, at least one circuit has taken the view that
class arbitration may not be imposed in the absence of an agreement
because it alters the parties negotiated cost-benefit analysis. 33
In reaching its decision, the Court in Stolt-Nielsen relied on Section
10(a)(4) of the FAA, which permits a court to vacate an arbitration decision
when "the arbitrators exceeded their powers. 34 The Court then considered

(1998), available at http://www.iccwbo.org/uploadedFiles/Court/Arbitrationlother/rules-arb
_english.pdf (declining facilitation of class arbitration).
31 See supra note 4 and accompanying text (identifying circuit split on the enforceability of
class arbitration when the contract is silent). See generally Blankley, supra note 21, at 706-09
(identifying Bazzle's potential impact on arbitration). Blankley argues that the Bazzle decision is
problematic because it provides no guidance for lower courts on how to handle class arbitration
proceedings. Id. Moreover, businesses may be certain to craft contracts explicitly prohibiting
class arbitration or working around the Bazzle holding. Id. at 707-08.
32 See, e.g., Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 489
F.3d
580, 590 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding silence does not preclude consolidation and arbitrators have
discretion to allow consolidation); Rollins, Inc. v. Garrett, 176 F. App'x 968, 969 (1lth Cir. Apr.
19, 2006) (holding silence does not preclude class arbitration and prohibition of class arbitration
is unconscionable); Pedcor Mgmt. v. Nations Pers. of Tex., 343 F.3d 355, 363 (5th Cir. 2003)
(requiring arbitration clauses silent on clause arbitration submission to arbitrator). In Westchester
Fire Ins., the Third Circuit determined that imposing class arbitration is a procedural issue and
should be resolved by the arbitrator. 489 F.3d at 590. In reaching this decision, the court
considered the following factors: prior federal case law (including the Bazzle decision), the
agreement by both parties to arbitrate disputes, the silence in the contract with respect to class
arbitration, and the federal policy strongly in favor of utilizing arbitration. Id. at 586-90.
33 See Champ v. Siegel Trading Co., 55 F.3d 269, 275 (7th Cir. 1995) (cautioning court's
judgment should not deprive one party of benefit of bargain).
34 Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2006) (providing grounds for reversing
arbitration awards). Section 10(a)(4) provides that an award may be vacated "where the
arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and
definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made." Id. In Stolt-Nielsen, the Court
noted that the rationale behind this section was that arbitrators are charged with contract
interpretation, and not formulating public policy. Stolt-Nielsen III, 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1767 (2010)
(quoting 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (2006)) (identifying Court's authority for vacating arbitrator's
decision). However, in her dissent, Justice Ginsburg emphatically stated that the Supreme Court
prematurely adjudicated the issue on appeal. Stolt-Nielsen III, 130 S. Ct. at 1777 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting). She explained that the arbitration panel's resolution was a partial award and the case
was still at a very early stage. Id. at 1778-79. As such, the award was an interlocutory decision,
and the Court should not have intervened so early in the process, particularly because the panel
did not render a final judgment. Id.; see generally Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233
(1945) (explaining final judgment rule). The final judgment rule essentially states that a decision
should not be reviewed until a "final decision" has been rendered. Id. The Court in Catlin
describes a "final decision" as "one which ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for
the court to do but execute the judgment." Id. The rule is supported by a number of public policy
considerations such as preventing piecemeal litigation and avoiding undue delays from appeals of
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AnimalFeeds's arguments in support of imposing class arbitrationspecifically that public policy favored the imposition of class arbitration."
The Court criticized this argument and the arbitration panel because the
panel was acting as though it had the common law authority of a court to
develop laws based on public policy. 3 6 The Court cautioned that the
arbitration panel should have focused on a discernible rule of law for
guidance, such as the FAA, maritime law, or New York law. 17
Next, the Court considered the application of its decision in Bazzle
to the present case."' In Bazzle, a plurality opinion, the Court concluded
that the determination of whether a contract was silent on class arbitration
rested with the arbitrator and not the courts.39 Writing for the majority,
interlocutory decisions. Id. at 233-34. This rule is one that is firmly embedded in the federal
courts. Id. at233.
35 Stolt-Nielsen III, 130 S. Ct. at 1768 (outlining arguments justifying class arbitration's use).
The Court noted that AnimalFeeds outlined three arguments in support of imposing class
arbitration: (1) that class arbitration is permitted under Bazzle, absent an express provision to the
contrary; (2) the arbitration clause should be construed to allow class arbitration for public policy
reasons; and (3) the arbitration clause would be unconscionable and unenforceable otherwise. Id.
The arbitrators rejected the first argument and did not consider the third, suggesting that public
policy considerations had an overwhelming impact on the decision to impose class arbitration.
Id.
36 See id. at 1768-71 (outlining difference between arbitrator and judge).
37 See id. (determining arbitrators' decisions should be grounded in law and not public
policy). But see id. at 1780-81 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (defending arbitration panel's decision
and consideration of public policy objectives). The dissent displays that the panel's decision was
consistent with a prior decision by the New York Court of Appeals and federal maritime law. Id.
at 1781 & n.9. In addition, the panel considered the arbitration clause's language that "any
dispute arising from the making, performance or termination of this Charter Party shall be put to
arbitration." Id. at 1781 (internal quotation marks omitted). The panel agreed with a number of
prior arbitration cases, interpreting similarly worded arbitration clauses, that class arbitration was
permissible. Id. The dissent proceeded to consider the issues raised by the majority, such as the
precept that arbitration "'is a matter of consent, not coercion."' Id. at 1782 (quoting Volt Info.
Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989)).
Importantly, Justice Ginsburg noted that parties may continue to determine when they will utilize
arbitration and the parties with which they will arbitrate. Id. In the present case, AnimalFeeds
purported to bring class arbitration on behalf of a class whose claims arose from a charter party
agreement that was subject to arbitration. Id. As such, companies like Stolt-Nielsen that elect to
pursue arbitration with these individuals may only proceed forward on the specific issues outlined
in the charter party agreements. Id. at 1782-83.
38 Stolt-Nielsen III, 130 S. Ct. at 1770 (illustrating problem with respondents' reliance on
Bazzle). Justice Alito noted that the Court in Bazzle confronted three issues: (1) whether the
court or the arbitrator should decide whether a contract was silent on class arbitration; (2) what
standard should be used to determine whether a contact was in fact silent on class arbitration; and
(3) whether class arbitration was properly awarded. Id. at 1771. The Court, however, never
moved beyond the first question. Id. at 1772.
39 Stolt-Nielsen Il, 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1771 (2010) (identifying and explaining the nuanced
holding of the Court in Bazzle). Justice Stevens concurred with the Bazzle judgment so that there
would be a controlling decision; he disagreed with the rationale set forth in the Court's opinion.
Id. at 1772. Ultimately, his opinion did not address the question of whether the arbitrator or the
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Justice Alito insinuated that, because a plurality reached this conclusion, it
was not a binding requirement. 40 The majority also agreed that Bazzle did
not resolve the issue of what rule to apply when deciding whether class
arbitration is permitted. 4' In guiding the Court's ultimate resolution of this
issue, the majority relied on the basic precept that arbitration "is a matter of
consent, not coercion. 4 2 Accordingly, the Court concluded that a party
must not be compelled to submit to class arbitration unless there is a
43
contractual basis suggesting that the parties agreed to do so.
courts were the ultimate decision makers with respect to contract interpretation. Id.
40

Id. at 1771-72 (discussing unanswered question from Bazzle). Justice Alito explained that

a plurality decided the first issue in Bazzle, holding that an arbitrator must decide whether a
contract is silent on class arbitration. Id. at 1771. Accordingly, the plurality vacated the decision
of the Supreme Court of South Carolina and remanded the case for a decision by the arbitrator on
whether the contract was in fact silent. Id. at 1772. While Justice Stevens concurred with the
plurality's decision to vacate and remand the case, he disagreed with their rationale and did not
adopt a position with respect to the first issue. Id. Thus, there was no majority position with
respect to the first issue presented in Bazzle. Id. But see Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539
U.S. 444, 451-52 (2003) (stating arbitrator should interpret relevant questions of contract
interpretation). The Court stated:
The parties agreed to submit to the arbitrator "[a]ll disputes ... relating to this contract
.... And the dispute about what the arbitration contract in each case means (i.e.,
whether it forbids the use of class arbitration procedures) is a dispute "relating to this
contract" and the resulting "relationships." Hence the parties seem to have agreed that
an arbitrator, not a judge, would answer the relevant question.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
41 See Stolt-Nielsen III, 130 S.Ct. at 1772 (explaining discrepancy between both parties in
the interpretation of the Bazzle decision). Justice Alito highlighted the arbitration panel's
discussion of the appropriate standard:
Claimants argue that Bazzle requires clear language that forbids class arbitration in
order to bar a class action. The Panel, however, agrees with Respondents that the test
is a more general one arbitrators must look to the language of the parties' agreement
to ascertain the parties' intention whether they intended to permit or to preclude class
action.
Id. (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. 49(a)) (identifying arbitration panel's decision); see also
Buckner, supra note 1, at 349 (noting the Court in Bazzle provided little guidance on how
arbitrators should interpret arbitration clauses). Buckner also argues that because Bazzle allows
arbitrators to interpret arbitration clauses, it is unlikely that courts will vacate an arbitrator's
decision unless the decision truly is in "manifest disregard of the law." Id. at 350.
42 Stolt-Nielsen III, 130 S.Ct. at 1773 (quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland
Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989)) (evaluating basic rules guiding arbitration).
The Court explained that arbitrators have a duty to "'give effect to the contractual rights and
expectations of the parties."' Id. at 1774 (quoting Volt, 489 U.S. at 479). This duty derives from
the parties' agreement to forgo litigation and rely on the arbitrator's judgment to resolve their
dispute. Id. The Court's prior jurisprudence fortifies the consensual nature of arbitration in
allowing parties to structure and tailor arbitration agreements to meet their individual needs. Id.
43 See id. at 1775 (announcing Court's holding).
In the present case's context, the parties
stipulated that they reached no agreement on the issue of class arbitration, but both parties
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In Stolt-Nielsen, the Supreme Court drastically departed from prior
precedent by trumping the arbitration panel's authority to determine an
important procedural issue.44 The decision contravenes a number of cases
holding that arbitrators should decide procedural questions relating to
arbitration, and the Court denies the panel the opportunity to clarify the
class arbitration's limits by defining the parties and issues within the
prospective class. 45 Additionally, the majority mistakenly emphasizes the
coercive effects of class arbitration. 46 The arbitration panel's class

consented to allowing the arbitration panel to make a determination on class arbitration
proceedings. Id. Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the parties could not be compelled to
submit to class arbitration. Id. The majority acknowledged a critical point advanced by the
arbitration panel, specifically that the agreement never precluded the use of class arbitration. Id.
The Court further acknowledged that this analysis was appropriate in certain contexts. Id. In
Howsam, for example, the Court concluded that "procedural" questions that arise out of the
dispute and affect the final disposition are for the arbitrator to decide, and not courts. Id. (citing
Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 84 (2002)). The Court admitted the basis
for that decision rests on the principle that when parties to a bargain have not agreed to a
particular term, the court or arbitrator may supply a term that is reasonable under the
circumstances. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 204 (1979)). The Court,
however, cautioned that an implicit agreement to authorize class arbitration could not be inferred
simply from the fact that the parties agreed to arbitration in the first place. Id. Furthermore, the
imposition of class arbitration over bilateral arbitration significantly altered the parties'
expectations with respect to procedural safeguards, privacy, etc. Id. at 1775-76. But see id. at
1783 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (extolling the benefits of class arbitration). The dissent observes
that when arbitration is costly and the claims are modest, there is little incentive, if any, for
potential claimants to seek arbitration. Id. Class arbitration, however, provides an avenue for
claimants to pursue a course of action rather than feeling compelled to forgo arbitration. Id. The
dissent observes that the holding may be limited to situations where the parties have relatively
equal bargaining power. Id. See generally Randall D. Quarles, Courts Disagree: Is Arbitration a
"Class" Act?, 68 ALA. LAW. 476, 480 (2007) (acknowledging class arbitration's benefits where
potential fees for arbitration would prohibit individuals from pursuing arbitration).
44 See Stolt-Nielsen III, 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1779-80 (2010) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(admonishing Court for interpreting issue that parties agreed to submit to arbitration). Justice
Ginsburg notes that the parties consented to and submitted the contract-construction issue
specifically to the arbitration panel and that the Court's interference allows one party to
essentially repudiate an agreement to settle with an arbitration panel. Id. at 1779-80. Moreover,
the dissent cautions that the Court's deliberation of the case was premature because the arbitration
panel only rendered a partial award. Id. at 1778. This directly contravenes the well-established
final judgment rule that requires appellate courts to review cases after a final judgment is
rendered and the full record is available. Id.; Blankley, supra note 21, at 697 (illustrating
movement towards empowering arbitrators).
45 See Stolt-Nielsen III, 130 S. Ct. at 1782 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (scrutinizing decision to
usurp power and prevent arbitrators from clarifying limitations on class arbitration); see also
supra note 11 (explaining that Rule 7 of AAA requires arbitrators to define the class in final
arbitration award); supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text (awarding arbitrators authority to
interpret procedural issues).
46 See Stolt-Nielsen III, 130 S. Ct. at 1774 (identifying arbitration as a consensual endeavor).
The majority noted that class arbitration differs from bilateral arbitration because it changes
parties' expectation in numerous ways. Id. at 1776. For instance, the presumption of privacy in
bilateral arbitration does not apply to class arbitrations. Id. Also, the commercial stakes of class
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arbitration award is not coercive for three reasons: (1) the parties expressly
consented to the authority of the arbitration panel to determine this issue;
(2) the parties agreed to resolve their disputes through arbitration; and (3)
the parties collectively stipulated the types of disputes that could be
resolved through arbitration.47
In fact, traditional rules of contract
interpretation suggest that even though the contract was silent on the use of
class arbitration, it is reasonable to infer such a provision because the
parties agreed to the terms above. 48 The Court's holding essentially
permits the objecting party to define the agreement by citing its own
general opposition to class arbitration as the basis for finding that the
parties did not agree to such arbitration in the agreement. 49 As such, the
decision proves problematic because it vitiates the panel's authority to
decide this procedural question and undermines nearly a 50 decade of
jurisprudence limiting the judiciary's role in arbitration matters.
Importantly, the Stolt-Nielsen decision fails to clarify the holding's
scope or the type of language required to demonstrate that the parties
consented to class arbitration. 5 1 First, the dissent recognizes that the
holding's scope is too broad and fruitlessly attempts to mitigate its impact
by suggesting that the holding does not apply to contracts of adhesion that
are offered on a "take-it-or-leave-it" basis.52 Unfortunately, this analysis
will have little practical effect because the holding does not focus on the
parties' relatively equal bargaining power, but instead relies on whether
there is a contractual basis for the parties' consent to class arbitration. 5' By

arbitration are much higher than bilateral arbitration. Id.
47 See id. at 1775-76 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (emphasizing charter party's stipulation to
use
arbitration along with the issues subject to arbitration).
48 See sources cited supra note 43 and accompanying text (observing that contract principles
allow the arbitration panel to substitute reasonable terms).
49 See Stolt-Nielsen III, 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1781 (2010) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (identifying
Stolt-Nielsen's objection to class arbitration).
Stolt-Nielsen argued that "'the bulk of
international shippers would never intend to have their disputes decided in a class arbitration."'
Id. (quoting App. To Pet. For Cert. 52(a)). Justice Ginsburg, however, noted that the issue before
appeal was not whether the arbitrators decided this case correctly, but whether the decisions
exceeded the panel's powers. Id.
50 See supra notes 21-28 and accompanying text (recounting prior Supreme Court decisions
that enforced power of arbitrators); see also Blankley, supra note 21, at 697 (illustrating
movement towards empowering arbitrators).
51 See infra notes 52, 54-55 and text accompanying notes 52-57 (illustrating potential
problems with the Stolt-Nielsen decision).
52 See Stolt-Nielsen III, 130 S. Ct. at 1783 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (observing that Court
spares parties subject to adhesion contracts).
53 See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text (outlining majority's argument that class
arbitration is consensual and cannot be imposed without contractual support). The Court's
decision was premised on the belief that the parties must consent to class arbitration within the
contract governing their relationship. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text. Often,
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failing to define the holding's scope, the Court's decision negatively
impacts groups such as employees and consumers who have inferior
bargaining power against big corporations that are responsible for drafting
contracts and arbitration clauses in the first place.5 4 Furthermore, the Court
fails to provide any guidance on the type of contractual language required
to demonstrate that the parties contemplated or consented to class
arbitration.55 Specifically, the Court states that silence is not sufficient to
demonstrate that the parties consented to class arbitration, but the Court
simultaneously refrains from requiring express consent.5 6 This uncertainty
not only leaves many claimants in the dark, it causes confusion for courts
and arbitrators alike in the future.57
Finally, the Court in Stolt-Nielsen de-emphasizes class arbitration's
benefits, while simultaneously increasing the requirements to certify a
prospective class.58 Class arbitration provides a mechanism for claimants

however, consumers and employees may concede to the terms of an agreement because they lack
a meaningful choice in the matter. See infra note 54 and accompanying text (describing how
potential plaintiffs are forced to accept terms of contracts despite inferior bargaining power). But
see McGuire and Roth, supra note 2, at 18 (noting that some courts reject express bans on class
arbitration unconscionable).
54 See McGuire and Roth, supra note 2, at 17-18 (explaining companies included class action
waivers in contracts after the Bazzle decision). In response to Bazzle, many businesses informed
consumers that class action arbitration was banned and that continued use of the business' service
was considered acceptance of these terms. Id. Similarly, employers revised their employment
agreements and informed employees that acceptance of the new agreement was a condition of
continued employment. Id. Even though these contracts dealt with express bans on class
arbitration, the underlying argument against such bans is that they prevent the vindication of
claimants' rights. Id.; see also Baker, supra note 29, at 366 (discussing class-action waivers
effect on consumers). Baker's article explores emerging case law in the area of class arbitration
and clause construction. Id. at 335-36. One emerging issue of importance is the consideration
that corporations with superior bargaining power could essentially cheat consumers out of small
sums of money by avoiding class arbitration. Id. at 366 (quoting Discover Bank v. Superior
Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005)).
55 See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp. (Stolt-Nielsen III), 130 S. Ct. 1758,
1776 n.10 (2010) (declining to provide guidance on contractual basis necessary to demonstrate
parties agreed to class arbitration). Justice Alito exclaimed that "[w]e have no occasion to decide
what contractual basis may support a finding that the parties agreed to authorize class-action
arbitration. Here, as noted, the parties stipulated that there was 'no agreement' on the issue of
class-action arbitration." Id.; see also Stolt-Nielsen III, 130 S. Ct. at 1783 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) ("[T]he Court does not insist on express consent to class arbitration. Class arbitration
may be ordered if 'there is a contractual basis for concluding that the part[ies] agreed' 'to submit
to class arbitration."').
56 See cases cited supra note 55 and accompanying text (explaining Court's failure to provide
guidance on the issue).
57 See supra note 55 and accompanying text, text accompanying note 56 (discussing Court's
vague affirmative authority requirement).
58 See Stolt-Nielsen III, 130 S. Ct. at 1775 (deciding class arbitration may not be inferred
because parties' calculated risks change).
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to present disputes that would otherwise be too costly for an individual or
where the amount of individual recovery is minimal.59 Such arbitration
plays an important role in our legal system by providing claimants with the
incentive to arbitrate their disputes and seek a legal right to relief 60
Importantly, big corporations generally shy away from class arbitration and

may take steps to alter their contracts so that they are silent on the class
arbitration issue. 6'

Unfortunately, the Stolt-Nielsen decision implicitly

creates a loophole for corporations because if the agreement is silent on the
issue of class arbitration, then the presiding arbitration panel will be forced
to conclude that class arbitration is not within the scope of the parties'

agreement.62
In Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds, the Supreme Court considered
whether class arbitration could be imposed on parties when the arbitration
agreement is silent on the issue. The Court held that arbitrators could not
impose class arbitration because it exceeded the scope of their powers. In

doing so, the Court departed from nearly a decade's jurisprudence favoring
the resolution of procedural issues by arbitrators. Arbitrators' decisionmaking authority is substantially diminished as a result. Moreover, the
decision implicitly provides businesses with the upper hand because
employers have the power to draft silent agreements, while potential
claimants, such as consumers or employees, will be less likely to bring
forward legally viable claims.
Keerthi Sugumaran

59
60

See supra note 43 (describing dissent's argument in favor of utilizing class arbitration).
See generally Quarles, supra note 43, at 480 (illustrating legal importance of class

actions).
61 See Quarles, supra note 43, at 476 (recognizing class arbitration decisions may be a
"poison pill" for businesses). Quarles notes that class arbitration is riskier for businesses because
they cannot appeal a class award and the size of the potential award increases in a class
proceeding. Id.; see also supra note 54 and accompanying text (describing trend with businesses
to expressly ban class arbitration). McGuire and Roth note that outright bans on class arbitration
have been successfully challenged because they are unconscionable and prevent claimants from
vindicating their rights. McGuire and Roth, supra note 2, at 17-18.
62 See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp. (Stolt-Nielsen 111), 130 S. Ct.
1758
1775-76 (2010) (holding class arbitration may not be inferred or imposed if agreement is silent);
see also Rollins, Inc. v. Garrett, 176 F. App'x 968, 969 (1lth Cir. Apr. 19, 2006) (holding that
silence should not be interpreted as precluding class action because it is unconscionable). The
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit noted that interpreting a silent contract as precluding
class action would be unconscionable under state law because doing so "'preclude[s] the
possibility that a group of . ..customers might join together to seek relief that would be
impractical for any of them to obtain alone."' Id. (quoting Powertel, Inc. v. Bexley, 743 So. 2d
570, 576 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)).

